New Directions
Volume 11 | Issue 4

Article 8

10-1-1984

U.S.-Caribbean Relations: Before and After
Grenada
Linus A. Hoskins

Follow this and additional works at: http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections
Recommended Citation
Hoskins, Linus A. (1984) "U.S.-Caribbean Relations: Before and After Grenada," New Directions: Vol. 11: Iss. 4, Article 8.
Available at: http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections/vol11/iss4/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Howard @ Howard University. It has been accepted for inclusion in New Directions by
an authorized administrator of Digital Howard @ Howard University. For more information, please contact lopez.matthews@howard.edu.

INTERNATIONAL

U.S.Caribbean
Relations:

Before and After
Grenada
By Linus A. Hoskins

n 1823 the Monroe Doctrine justified
“U. S. interference in any and every
thing not be her liking in either the
North or the South of the continent.”
Such interventionist policy has since be
come a permanent feature of U. S. policy
toward the Caribbean and the Western
hemisphere.
The Caribbean has always been icgarded as an American backyard and, ipso
facto, within the U. S. sphere of influence.
Respect for the national sovereignty and
integrity of the Caribbean nations and
their people has been regarded as of
minor importance.
Indeed recent events have shown that
the United States pursued a “big stick”
policy of destructive engagement toward
specific Caribbean countries. This policy
has been carried out in collusion with
other selected Caribbean governments.

I

The Carter Policy

When the Carter administration came to
power, one of its first pronouncements
would be priority attention to the Carib
bean. This was supposed to mark “a new
era of friendship and cooperation be
tween Washington and a one-time Amer
ican lake sprinkled with emerging new
ministates determined not only to be in
dependent but to act independently.”1
In August 1977, Rosalyn Carter, Sec
retary of State Cyrus Vance, and U.N.
Ambassador Andrew Young, visited the
Caribbean on goodwill missions “of
atonement of United States transgres
sions in the region” as part of the Carter
administration’s objective to “spin a new
policy web around a region long neglected

by Washington power brokers obsessed
with East-West relations.”2
Ambassador Young indicated that the
purpose of the Caribbean tour was to con
vince Caribbean leaders that the Carter
administration meant to pay more atten
tion to what they said and what they
wanted for their countries and to meddle
less in how they and their people choose
to run their affairs, especially Guyana and
Jamaica, the latter then under the stew
ardship of Prime Minister Michael Manley. He stressed that the Carter admini
stration did not look with hostility at their
choice of Socialism and did not see a
threat in their friendly ties with President
Fidel Castro of Cuba.3 He also expressed
the idea of “an integrated Caribbean part
nership as being in the interest of the
United States and its neighbors.”4
Former Ambassador Terence Todman
put the Carter policy toward the Carib
bean this way:
U. S. official involvement with the Eng
lish-speaking Caribbean was extremely
limited while our substantial involve
ment in the affairs of the Spanish
speaking Caribbean was, . . . often
aimed in the wrong direction. In the
past, security interests have been the
overriding concern of the U.S. govern
ment in its dealing with the Caribbean,
. . . what we seek in the Caribbean to
day is not domination, disproportionate
influence, or the right to intervene in
other nations internal affairs. We seek
instead a mature, healthy relationship
with all states in the region, founded on
respect for sovereignty, recognition of
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common interests and consultation on
matters of mutual concern . . . . 5
President Carter also reaffirmed the
“vital interest” of the Caribbean to the
United States and America’s firm commit
ment to human rights, democratization,
significant support for economic develop
ment, acceptance and respect for ide
ological pluralism, unequivocal respect
for national sovereignty, strong encour
agement of regional cooperation, an ac
tive Caribbean role in world affairs and
non-intervention in the Caribbean be
cause America saw herself “as part of the
Caribbean community” — a position
which was quite unpopular and suspect
among many Caribbean peoples.
Perplexed by rapid turnovers of gov
ernments in the Eastern Caribbean (a
coup in Grenada, the downfall of Patrick
John’s administration in Dominica, the
electoral defeat of John Compton in St.
Lucia, and the rising tide of discontent in
Guyana and Antigua), then Secretary of
State Vance dispatched State Depart
ment specialist Philip Habib “to test the
Caribbean pulse, perhaps to help the Car
ter administration make some adjust
ments in the ‘bright-spot’— ‘trouble-spot’
evaluation. ”6
It is noteworthy that Habib selectively
excluded Grenada from his itinerary. He
visited St. Lucia and Antigua, where antiCuban sentiments were very strong, but
ignored St. Vincent. A subsequent Habib
report urged an increase in the regional
aid program which totaled about $155 mil
lion in fiscal 1979 to stem the tide against
an apparent Cuban Communist influence
and aggression.
The Carter administration then estab
lished the Caribbean Task Force at Key
West, Florida, as one component of the
U.S. Forces Caribbean Command. Con
sisting of a staff of 75 persons, the Task
Force’s mission was to monitor develop
ments in the Caribbean, conduct training
exercises, and devise contingency plans
for the use of U.S. forces, as a means of
combating Cuban Communist infiltration
into the island nations in the area. Under
the plan, the United States, Britain, and
Canada would provide coast guard-type
training in Barbados and possibly sell pa
trol boats to that country and others.
Barbados took the lead in forming a
coast guard and in return for its pro-West
ern efforts received $5 million in Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) credits and $84,000
in International Military and Education
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Training (IMET) funds. The proposed co
ordinated patrol force also included, in ad
dition to Barbados, St. Lucia, St. Vin
cent, and Dominica.
Caribbean leaders, however, were
much less alarmed at the spread of Cuban
influence than was the Carter administra
tion. They have argued that acceptance of
Cuban help did not signify embrace of
Communist doctrine, but rather admira
tion for those parts of the Cuban system
— education, health and social organiza
tion — that worked in the very conditions
that stymied progress in other Caribbean
islands.

“G renada... angered the
United States by voting
along with Cuba against
the United Nations
General Assembly
resolution. . . that strongly
condemned Soviet
aggression in
Afghanistan. ”

New Jewel Movement led by Maurice
Bishop. The United States publicly ac
cused Cuba of instigating and assisting in
the overthrow. However, a confidential
CIA report dismissed the accusation and
concluded that “as far as we can tell, the
coup occurred . . . from local circum
stances. The Soviets had nothing to do
with it or the Cubans either. ”8
In addition, the development of ex
tremely close ties between Cuba and
Grenada also worried the Carter adminis
tration to the extent that when Grenada
and Cuba established diplomatic relations
on April 16, 1979, Frank Ortiz, the United
States ambassador to the Eastern Carib
bean stationed in Barbados, delivered a
note to Prime Minister Bishop in which
the Carter administration indicated that
the United States government would
view with “grave concern and displeas
ure” any tendency on the part of Grenada
to develop military ties with Cuba.9 As a
riposte, Prime Minister Bishop in a radio
broadcast denounced the United States
hegemonism as follows:
. . . No one, no matter how mighty and
powerful they are will be permitted to
dictate to the government of Grenada
who we can be friendly with and what
kind of friendly relations we must have
with other countries . . . io

Yet the Carter administration was ob
Grenada also angered the United
sessed with the spectre of Soviet domina
States
by voting along with Cuba against
tion of the Caribbean as supposedly
the
United
Nations General Assembly
evidenced by the Soviet Union trying to
resolution
in
January 1980 which strongly
secure its base in Cuba by surrounding it
condemned
Soviet
aggression in Afghani
with friendly nations, by “totalitarian
stan;
by
its
support
for the Sandinistas in
Marxist’s” control of Grenada, and Cuban
the
Nicaraguan
revolution;
by its soli
advisers training guerrillas in Grenada for
darity
with
the
popular
struggle
against
subversive action in Trinidad, and by
the
military
dictatorship
in
El
Salvador
Fidel Castro’s grand design to forge a
Marxist axis running across the Carib (which the United States supports); and
bean from Grenada to Jamaica to Havana. by its support for the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) which the United
As Abraham Lowenthal surmises:
States only recognizes as a “terrorist
. . . the preoccupation of the State De
organization. ”
partment and the White House with
The second factor of concern to the
Fidel Castro (did) not sit well with most
United
States was the election of leaders
Caribbean leaders who perceive(d)
in
St.
Lucia,
who vowed to limit foreign
Castro as only one of the many Carib
investment
and
were especially friendly
bean actors rather than as a Cold War
toward
Cuba;
the
third was the presence
instrum ent. . . 7
of 450 Cuban personnel in Jamaica, in
The Cuban Furor
cluding alleged high-ranking Cuban intel
The Carter administration’s concern ligence officers (DGI), some of whom had
about the restlessness and revolutionary Soviet (KGB) connections; the fourth
mood sweeping through the Caribbean was the presence of 100 Cubans in
resulted from several factors: the first Guyana, 350 in Grenada, and 15 in St.
was the March 13, 1979, overthrow of the Lucia.
As is evident from Prime Minister
Eric Gairy government in Grenada by the

Bishop’s statement, his government al
ways opposed United States hegemonic
policy toward the Caribbean and inter
ference in Grenada’s internal affairs.
However, Grenada had always sought
“normal and friendly relations” with the
United States and insisted that “countries
must have the right to pursue their own
process.” The government of Grenada
also viewed the decision of President Car
ter to increase United States military
presence in the Caribbean as “unjustified”
and a “very serious threat” that was not
only designed to contribute to tension in
the region but also to serve as a counter
productive force against “progressive
change” in the region. One retaliatory
measure the PRG took was to organize a
“popular army and a people’s militia” to
defend its sovereignty.
In addition, in May 1979 the govern
ment of Grenada accused the CIA of hav
ing drawn up a pyramid-shaped plan to
destabilize Grenada. The plan called for,
inter alia, instigating and organizing
strikes throughout the island, planting
false reports about Grenada in [the me
dia], and encouraging prominent per
sons, organizations, and governments in
the region to attack the Grenadian
revolution.
The government also accused the
United States of complicity in a June 19,
1980 bomb explosion directly under the
platform from which the Prime Minister
was addressing a mass rally. [He] was not
hurt but two persons were killed and sev
eral others were severely wounded. And
in November 1980, the security forces
defused an attempt to overthrow the Peo
ple’s Revolutionary Government of Gre
nada (PRG). Again direct United States
involvement was evidenced by the sei
zure of documents which proved that
three American ships from Miami were to
arrive at three strategic coastal locations
in Grenada, viz, Gouyave, Grenville and
Westerhall, to deliver arms and about 100
mercenaries.
The reasons for the United States at
tempts to destabilize Grenada have al
ready been outlined. What needs to be
emphasized here is that the United States
government did not care much about what
the Grenadian revolution was doing for
the masses of Grenadian people. What
was important was the so-called security
interest of the United States.
The United States was well aware that
the poverty stricken Caribbean region

was in ferment. It also saw a revolution in
altruism. The Reagan people are moti
Grenada coming on top of the earlier
vated primarily by fear that the Cubans
Cuban revolution. It was therefore wor
and behind them the Russians, will be
ried about a revolutionary virus spreading
coming across our southern borders if
throughout the region. Even though Gre
we don't involve ourselves aggressively
nada is a small country, any revolution
in the area . . . 11
there was significant to the United States
President Reagan himself has stated
due to the fact that it could serve as a par that the Carter administration was “woe
adigm to other Caribbean islands that are fully lacking” in its response to alleged
experiencing similar conditions.
Soviet-backed subversion in the Carib
bean and Communist activity in Central
The Reagan Policy
America. The President has interpreted
When the [Reagan] administration came his 1980 political mandate as “the restora
to power, its primary foreign policy goal tion of the nation’s power and prestige in
was to stem the tide against perceived response to a heightened neglected So
viet threat. ” This interpretation refers to
the so-called Reagan Doctrine which
means the “subordination of all major pol
“The administration sees icies to revitalizing the containment of
the Caribbean ‘as an area Soviet expansion.”12
The Reagan administration has re
of opportunity for the
jected the “strategic passivity” of the Car
ter administration and is convinced that
U .S.’”
the Carter administration’s reaction to
the “most brazen imperial drive in his
tory” by the Soviet Union and its ally,
Cuba, had been too little and too late.
There are three major components of
the Reagan administration’s policy to
ward the Caribbean:

worldwide Soviet aggression in general
and to “draw the line” against supposed
Cuban Communist adventurism in the
Caribbean and Latin America, in
particular.
There is no hesitation on the part of the
Reagan administration as to what U.S.
policy should be toward the Caribbean.
The administration sees the Caribbean
“as an area of opportunity for the U. S. ”
This immutable policy stance differs
drastically from that of the Carter admin
istration, which has been accused of pur
suing a regional policy of failure and
inability. For example, the Carter admin
istration is accused of being unable to de
termine just what the Cubans and the
Soviets were up to in the region, how vis
ible the U. S. should be in the Caribbean,
and whether and how it should compete
with the ubiquitous Cubans.
In comparing the two administrations’
policy objectives/positions toward the
Cubans, one State Department official is
reported to have said:
. . . The Carter administration got in
volved with the region out of a sense of
well-intentioned but vaguely focused

(i) Support for free elections and
broadly based democratic institu
tions as the best way for each country to
pursue its development according to the
wishes of its people;
(ii) The Caribbean Basin Initiative
(CBI) to help Basin economies overcome
structural underdevelopment. This pro
posed integrated program of trade, in
vestment, and financial assistance has as
its centerpiece a U.S. offer of one-way
free trade to the region’s smaller coun
tries. It also seeks authority to offer U. S.
firms significant tax incentives for new in
vestment and to increase direct financial
assistance for both urgent balance-ofpayments problems and longer term
structural imbalances;
(iii) Collective security efforts and
security assistance to help democrat
ically-oriented governments resist vio
lent, externally supported insurgents
who would impose totalitarian regimes
hostile to the United States.
It is interesting to note that the admin
istration’s Caribbean policy also has im
plications beyond the Caribbean. As a
result of its determination to counter per
ceived growing Cuban and Soviet intru
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sion into the region, the administration
has mistakingly placed Caribbean issues
within a Cold War, East-West confronta
tional matrix. Ipso facto, it has annihilated
President Carter’s policy of respect for
national sovereignty and “ideological plu
ralism” in the Caribbean.
While Caribbean governments regard
the area as a “zone of peace,” the Reagan
administration regards the area a “battle
ground in the global confrontation with
the Soviet Union. ”
The Reagan administration came into
office loudly expressing its determination
to turn back the Cuban Communist tide
sweeping the Caribbean. As a result,
Cuba’s activities abroad became the
“focal point” of the administration’s atten
tion and it sounded the warning signal that
alleged Cuban adventurism abroad as re
flected by the deployment of 40,000 to
50,000 Cuban soldiers was not only a “se
rious problem” but also a “threat to peace
and stability around the world.” In the
perception of the administration, Cuba
symbolizes Soviet influence in the area
and acting as a “stooge for the Soviet
Union,” Cuba is attempting to turn the
Caribbean into a “Red Lake.” According
to President Reagan:
. . . I f we do not act promptly and de
cisively in defense of freedom, new
Cubas will arise from the ruins of to
day s conflicts. Make no mistake, the
well-being and security of our neigh
bors in this region are in our own vital
interests . . .
Administration officials have publicly
stipulated the following terms for im
provement in relations with Cuba, viz.,
Cuba should:
(i) withdraw its internationalist forces
from Africa and Nicaragua
(ii) abandon its program of supporting
leftist guerrillas in Central America and
“wars of liberation” in Africa and
(iii) accept the return of 2,555 Mariel
boatlift criminals who are being held in
U.S. jails.
The administration’s warning of an im
pending Cuban Communist encirclement,
as contained in a State Department re
lease, “Cuba’s Renewed Support for Vio
lence in Latin America,” was that “first in
Africa and now in Latin America and the
Caribbean,” Cuba’s policy has again
shifted to re-emphasize the Caribbean. In
another release, “Strategic Situation in
NEW DIRECTIONS OCTOBER 1984

Central America and the Caribbean, ” the
administration has described the follow
ing development “as a state of danger in
the Caribbean Basin,” viz, the fact that
there is a:
. . . new Cuban strategy for uniting the
left in the countries of the region, com
mitting it to violence, arming it, train
ing it in warfare, and attempting to use
it for the destruction of existing govern
ments . . .
The administration’s charge is that

“It took the United States
almost 26 years to nor
malize relations and to
deal with Chairman Mao’s
China. History may well
repeat itse lf.. . ”
Cuba’s President Fidel Castro is capitaliz
ing on “targets of opportunity” in the Car
ibbean to facilitate Soviet control over an
area the administration views as vital to
the national security interests of the
United States. More specifically, the ad
ministration has accused Cuba of receiv
ing a massive flow of Soviet arms which
not only ossifies Cuba’s ability to project
military power outside its own territory
but also represents a tremendous strate
gic gain for the Soviet Union in terms of
its global and hemispheric aims.
The administration is also concerned
that now Cuba is the strongest power in
Latin America, and that the Cubans, with
continuing Soviet assistance, will have
considerable success in their determina
tion “to exploit the situation (in the Carib
bean and Central America) in ways that
pose a potential threat to U.S. security
interests.” The security threat that con
cerned the administration was the tri
angle between Cuba, Nicaragua, and
Grenada.
In terms of the “massive” flow of So
viet arms into Cuba, the administration
has estimated their value at over $1 billion
in 1982, exceeding the $600 million worth
of weapons in 1981. The Soviet arms in
clude “Turya” hydrofoil torpedo boats,
M124 “Hind” assault helicopters, a
squadron of supersonic MiG23 fighter air
craft in an air force of 200 modern planes,
naval vessels and 140 SAM-3 missiles.

It seems simplistic for the administra
tion to assume that Cuba will “crumble
under tough talk.” The administration’s
policy toward Cuba consisting of threats,
pressures, and the confrontational ap
proach has not worked. And it will never
work. Sooner or later the United States
must deal with Cuba.
It took the United States almost 25
years to normalize relations and to deal
with Chairman Mao’s Communist China.
History may well repeat itself if the U. S.
continues to pursue its hostile policy to
ward Cuba in view of the fact that diplo
matic relations were broken in 1961. It is
hoped also that future U.S. administra
tions will accept “the policy of gradual en
gagement”— toward Cuba— a policy that
would not produce “miracles” overnight,
but one that will start a dialogue, a con
structive process.
Since the United States recognizes and
conducts business with Communist coun
tries like the Soviet Union, China and the
Soviet bloc, the question that now arises
•is why wouldn’t the U.S. normalize rela
tions with Cuba, a country that can hardly
be regarded as a serious threat to the na
tional security interest of a superpower
like the United States?
This same historical irony of U. S. pol
icy toward the Caribbean is nowhere
more evident than on the small island of
Grenada. With a population of 110,000, an
area of 133 square miles, and nutmeg as
its major export, it is not the most likely
threat to (any) world power.
Nevertheless, ever since the New
Jewel Movement ousted the dictatorial
and repressive government of Eric Gairy
in a coup on March 13, 1979, U.S.-Gre
nada relations had been icy and rocky at
best. U.S. officials were convinced that
under Prime Minister Maurice Bishop,
the People’s Revolutionary Government
of Grenada “seem(ed) to be on the road to
becoming another Cuba.” They were
futher convinced that Cuba was bent on
developing Grenada as a “first bridgehead
for exporting socialist revolutions to the
English-speaking Caribbean and a base
for Cuban intervention in South America,
Southern Africa and U. S. shipping lines. ”
Reagan administration officials also pub
licly denounced the denial of human rights
in Grenada, lack of freedom of the press,
the detention of political prisoners, and
the non-scheduling of general elections.
In addition, U. S. officials said that most
Cubans in Grenada were “military ad

visers, some of whom infiltrate the gov
ernment to the extent of participating in
top-level decisions in almost every gov
ernment ministry.” This conclusion has
led the administration to believe that Gre
nada’s 250 to 2,000-member army and
several thousand-member militia “could
pose a threat to Grenada’s neighbors.”
Grenada’s foreign policy actions also
disturbed the administration. Grenada’s
establishment of close diplomatic ties
with Cuba, Nicaragua, the Soviet Union
and countries in the Eastern Bloc had
caused deep strategic concern for the ad
ministration. According to Defense Sec
retary Weinberger, in his fiscal 1983
report to Congress:
. . . in Grenada, Cuban influence has
reached such a high level that Grenada
can be considered a Cuban satellite
As a result of these beliefs and convic
tions, the administration tried to isolate
and undermine the popular Grenadian
revolutionary progress by undertaking a
series of action to:
□ destabilize
government;

and

overthrow

the

□ dissuade the European Economic
Community (EEC) from funding the $71
million airport at Point Salines;
□ undermine the government’s rule
through selective military and economic
exclusion, particularly exclusion from
participation in the Caribbean Basin Ini
tiative (CBI); and
□ deny diplomatic recognition to PRG’s
representatives in Washington.
Invasion of Grenada

On October 25, 1983 [following events
which led to Maurice Bishop’s murder],
the United States invaded the sovereign
nation of Grenada. As a result of the pres
idential invasion order signed at 6:00
p.m. on October 24, 1983, “Operation
Urgent Fury” was set up in motion. The
military operation consisted of a dispro
portionately overpowering contingent of
1,900 Marines, 5,000 paratroopers of the
82nd Airborne Division, a war fleet of 20
ships, and several units of Rangers, to
gether with about 300 troops from Ja
maica, Barbados, St. Lucia, Dominica,
Antigua and St. Vincent.
President Reagan has stated that his
decision to invade Grenada was dictated
by an “urgent, formal request” on Oc

tober 23, 1983 from five members of the
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
(OECS)13 for the United States “to assist
in a joint effort to restore order and de
mocracy on the island of Grenada.” Both
Barbados and Jamaica joined the OECS
members in that request. The request
was made in accordance with Article 8 of
the June 1981 OECS Treaty of
Association.
In a White House statement on Oc
tober 26, 1983 President Reagan gave the
following reasons for his “decisive action”
against Grenada:

“The primary goal... is to
transform the new Gre
nada into a showcase for
Reaganomics and
democracy.”
First, and of overriding importance to
protect innocent lives, including up to
1,000 Americans, whose personal
safety is, of course, my paramount con
cern. Second, toforestall further chaos.
And third, to assist in the restoration of
conditions of law and order and of gov
ernmental institutions to the island of
Grenada . . .
And in a nationally televised broadcast
on October 27, 1983 President Reagan
elucidated these reasons by indicating
that U.S. forces discovered a “complete
(Cuban) base with weapons and com
munications equipment” which implied
that Cuba was planning to occupy the is
land. According to the President, “weap
ons and ammunition (were) stacked
almost to the ceiling enough to supply
thousands of terrorists. ” The weapons in
cluded small arms, assault rifles, machine
guns, mortars and an “extremely lethal”
anti-aircraft battery. President Reagan
warned futher that Grenada was “a So
viet-Cuban colony being readied as a ma
jor military bastion to export terror and
undermine democracy.” The President
concluded his broadcast by assuring the
American people that “we got there just
in time.”
The evidence the administration has
offered to prove its case that the military
buildup in Grenada was indeed a serious
threat to the security of the Caribbean
and by extension to American security,

consisted of intelligence reports which
warned that since September 1983 the
Soviet Union’s activities had signaled its
“determination to move into the Western
Hemisphere as an imperial power and to
stay. ”
According to U. S. intelligence calcula
tion, the appointment of four-star General
Gennadiy I. Sazhenov as Moscow’s offical
ambassador to Grenada, signaled the So
viet Union’s intention to use Granada as
“a Soviet new world arsenal as well as an
air, sea and communications base.” In ad
dition, the administration has stated that
it captured a “treasure trove of docu
ments” which have shown that there
were agreem ents for the Soviet Union,
Cuba and North Korea to supply weapons
to Grenada under the Bishop govern
ment. The documents included five mili
tary assistance treaties for arms deliv
eries from 1980 through 1985, including
3,050 used and re-conditioned Soviet AK
47 assault rifles from the Soviet Union,
1.000 AK 47s from North Korea, 2,500
used Soviet carbines, 7,000 mines,
15.000 grenades, 1,050 pistols, 293
sniper rifles and 74 rocket-propelled gre
nade launchers. Another supply agree
ment with the Soviet Union called for the
delivery of 12,600 military uniforms,
25,200 pairs of socks and 6,300 belts,
helmets and pairs of boots.
Under these five military treaties, Gre
nada was also to receive $25.8 million in
aid from the Soviet Union and $12 million
from North Korea. And as a final effort to
prove that the Grenada invasion was
“right,” the administration publicly dis
played the 451 tons of captured munitions
at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland
on Veterans Day, November 11, 1983.
Some of the items from Grenada included
5.5 million rounds of 7.62 ammunition;
86,332 rounds of 23mm antiaircraft ammuntion; 1,200 sticks of dynamite; 1,626
Soviet AK 47 rifles; 180 Soviet M1945
submachine guns; ten 82mm mortars;
1,824 grenades; and eight 73mm SPG9
recoilless guns.
The Reagan administration, therefore,
concluded that, based on the huge volume
of weapons and the captured ammuni
tions, Grenada was “building a military
force out of proportion to the island’s size
or military needs.” Or in the words of
Vice President Bush: “I guess everything
we heard is true. This . . . awesome dis
play of arms . . . doesn’t look like a
friendly type of an arsenal to promote
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tourism somehow,” alluding to slain
Prime Minister Maurice Bishop’s oft re
peated reference to the PRG’s program to
promote tourism.14
Needless to say, the administration re
ceived much public fulcrum for its action.
For example, Admiral Wesley L.
McDonald, the Atlantic Commander-inchief who ran the military operation, has
stated that the President was justified in
invading Grenada because of the Cuban
military build-up on the island beween
October 6-18, 1983; the impersonation as
construction workers by Cuban soldiers;
and the existence of a terrorist training
base.
Also, a Newsweek Poll on Intervention
published November 7, 1983 indicated
that 53% of the respondents approved the
invasion of Grenada, 69% agreed with the
President that his action was necessary
“to protect the lives of Americans on the
island and assist those who want to
leave,” while 48% agreed that the invas
ion was justified in order “to replace the
Marxist revolutionaries who had seized
power. ”
Not to be outdone, certain members of
the OECS came out in their support of the
invasion. According to Prime Minister
John Compton of St. Lucia, the Cuban
“military build-up” was the main reason
that the OECS sought U.S. help. “The
United States came to our aid because we
thought the military build-up was threat
ening the whole of the southern Carib
bean,” he said.
Dominica’s Prime Minister Eugenia
Charles, who once described the modus
operandi of the PRG as an “aberration,”
suggested that: “It is not a matter of an
invasion. It is a matter of preventing this
thing (Marxist revolution) from spreading
to the islands.” The administration also
received support from right wing-Grenadians in the United States. Francis Paul,
vice president of the Grenada Democratic
Movement, for example, indicated: “I
don’t consider the envent as an invasion; I
consider it a liberating force.”
Postmortem

By November 3, 1983, the administration
was convinced that hostilities had ended
in Grenada so that the troops (described
by President Reagan as “heroes of free
dom”) could be withdrawn. However, the
White House had decided that 2,300
troops would remain in Grenada to be
withdrawn by December 23, 1983, thus
falling within the initial 60-day period that
NEW DIRECTIONS OCTOBER 1984

allowed the President, under the 1973 ments, at least in the English-speaking
War Powers Resolution [WPR], to intro Caribbean, so as to protect “perceived”
duce troops in a hostile area before trig American security interests . . .
gering the resolution’s restrictive
The unknown variable in this geo-polit
provisions.
ical equation is: Which Caribbean nation is
It was also decided that another 2,000 next in line for an invasion?
□
“non-combat” troops would remain for an
Linus A. Hoskins, Ph.D ., is an assistant professor
indefinite period. The casualty toll from in the International Studies Program, School of
the invasion was high; provisional figures Human Ecology, Howard University. The above
as of mid-November indicated that for was excerpted from his 95-page study on “U.S.-Caribbean-Grenada Relations: Before and After
Cuba there were 57 wounded, 634 cap Bishop. ”
tured as prisoners and 71 dead; for Gre
nada, there were 160 killed, 111 REFERENCE
wounded, and 68 captured; the casualty
xDon Bohning, “How the U.S. Has Faltered in
figures for the United States were 18 Caribbean.” The M iami Herald. (October 14,
killed, and 113 wounded with none 1979)
2Ibid.
missing.
As a post-mortem to the invasion, the
Reagan administration announced that
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